A comprehensive framework for securing the hardware and software supply chain against nation-state tampering, malicious silicon, and open-source component poisoning. Designed for critical infrastructure, defense contractors, and hardware manufacturers subject to NIST, FIPS, and EO 14028 compliance mandates.
A multi-layered attestation and verification protocol that ensures every component — from silicon to open-source library — meets strict integrity and provenance standards.
The framework is built on three pillars: Root of Trust (hardware-anchored cryptographic identity), Continuous Attestation (runtime verification of firmware and software integrity), and Provenance Tracking (cryptographic chain-of-custody for every component). These pillars work in concert to detect and block tampered or malicious components at every stage of the supply chain — from fabrication to deployment.
Immutable cryptographic identity anchored in silicon. Enables secure boot, measured boot, and attestation of firmware integrity at power-on.
Runtime verification of all executing code — kernel, drivers, and applications — against signed reference manifests. Detects runtime modifications and side-loaded code.
Cryptographically signed Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) and hardware bill of materials (HBOM) with full dependency tracking. Every component is traceable to its source.
Each stage in the lifecycle includes cryptographic measurement and verification against a known-good baseline.
Hardware root of trust provisioning, secure key injection, and immutable firmware signing. Each chip is assigned a unique device identity (UDI) signed by the manufacturer's CA.
Component provenance verification against HBOM. All subcomponents (chips, memory, storage) are cryptographically bound to the final assembly, creating a chain of custody.
Automated generation of software bill of materials (SBOM) with dependency resolution. Each library and binary is hashed and signed; vulnerability scanning against NVD and private databases.
UEFI Secure Boot and TPM-based measured boot capture platform configuration registers (PCRs) for all boot-time components. Remote attestation via TPM 2.0 quote.
Continuous monitoring of running processes, kernel modules, and application memory. Any deviation from the signed baseline triggers an alert and forensic snapshot.
Cryptographically signed updates with re-attestation after each patch. All updates are validated against the SBOM and HBOM before installation, preventing injection of malicious code.
The framework is designed to detect and mitigate the most prevalent supply chain threats observed in real-world attacks against critical infrastructure.
Adversary implants malicious code into UEFI/BIOS or device firmware during manufacturing or via poisoned updates. This framework detects via measured boot and runtime comparison.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1542 (Pre-OS Boot)Silicon-level implants (e.g., kill switches, covert channels) inserted during chip fabrication. Detected via hardware root of trust and cryptographic attestation of all microcode.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098 (Account Manipulation)Typosquatting, dependency confusion, and malicious code injection in open-source libraries. SBOM generation and continuous vulnerability scanning against known backdoor signatures.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1195 (Supply Chain Compromise)Stolen or misused code-signing certificates to sign malware. Framework verifies certificate chain and revokes untrusted signers via OCSP/CRL checks at load time.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1553 (Subvert Trust Controls)Each control maps to a specific threat vector and compliance requirement. All controls are validated against NIST SP 800-193 and FIPS 140-3.
| Control | Domain | Threat Mitigated | Compliance Mapping | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Secure Boot (UEFI) | Boot Integrity | Malicious Firmware | NIST 800-193 §3.2 | IMPLEMENTED |
| TPM 2.0 Remote Attestation | Runtime Verification | Firmware Tampering | FIPS 140-3 §4.5 | IMPLEMENTED |
| SBOM Generation (SPDX) | Component Inventory | Open-Source Poisoning | EO 14028 §4(c) | PARTIAL |
| Code Signing with Hardware HSMs | Code Integrity | Signing Abuse | NIST 800-57 §5.2 | IMPLEMENTED |
| Continuous Integrity Monitoring (IMA) | Runtime Integrity | Runtime Malware | NIST 800-193 §3.4 | PARTIAL |
| Hardware Root of Trust (DICE) | Identity & Attestation | Hardware Backdoors | FIPS 140-3 §4.2 | IMPLEMENTED |
Controls are implemented across all deployment environments. Partial controls are under active development with target completion Q3 2026.
Automated inventory of all open-source and third-party components, with real-time vulnerability correlation and dependency resolution.
Extract from a typical critical infrastructure deployment — 1,200+ components scanned for known vulnerabilities and backdoor signatures. All hashes are verified against signed manifests.
Full SBOM (SPDX 2.3) and vulnerability report available upon request. Request access →
Our supply chain security team provides comprehensive assessments, attestation framework implementation, and ongoing monitoring. All engagements are scoped to your regulatory requirements and threat profile.